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Togzhan Kassenova

From Antagonism to Partnership

The Uneasy Path of the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction

With a foreword by Christoph Bluth

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COVER PICTURE:
Right-centre: Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar leaving the White House in November 1991 after briefing President H. W. Bush on the Nunn-Lugar legislation (Courtesy of Senator Lugar's Office, U.S. Senate)
Top-left: SS-18 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile being readied for destruction in Suravatikha, Russia on August 27, 2002 (dismantlement funded by the U.S. Department of Defense CTR Programme); photo taken during Senator Lugar's trip (Courtesy of Senator Lugar's Office, U.S. Senate)
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To the memory of my father

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List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)
ASM	Air-to-surface Missile
ALCM	Air-launched Cruise Missile
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CRADA	Cooperation Research and Development Agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
DTRA	Defence Threat Reduction Agency
DOD	Department of Defence
DOE	Department of Energy
EkhZ	Electrochemical Plant
EMZ	Electromechanical Plant
FSB	"Federal'naia Sluzhba Bezopaznosti" (Russian Federal Security Service)
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GAN	'Gosatomnadzor' (Russian State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety)
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GUMO	"Glavnoe Upravlenie Ministerstva Oborony" (12th Main Directorate of Russian Ministry of Defence)
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ILAB	Inter-Laboratory Board
IPP	Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
ISTC	International Science and Technology Centre
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory

LEU	Low Enriched Uranium
MCC	Material Conversion and Consolidation
MCC 1SKhK)	Mining and Chemical Combine
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MIFI	Moscow Institute of Physical Engineering
MINATOM	Ministry of Atomic Energy
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOX	Mixed Oxide
MPC&A	Material Protection, Control and Accounting
NCI	Nuclear Cities Initiative
NIIAR	Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors
NIS	Newly Independent States
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRDC	National Resources Defence Council
NRC	National Resources Council
NSC	National Security Council
NTI	Nuclear Threat Initiative
PGS	Partnership for Global Security
R&D	Research and Development
RANSAC	Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
ROSATOM	Russian Federal Agency of Nuclear Energy
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty
SATC	Security Assessment and Training Centre
SCC 1SKhK)	Siberian Chemical Combine
SEC	Safety Enhancement Centre
SLBM	Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile
SNF	Spent Naval Fuel
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty

SRF	Russian Strategic Rocket Forces
SSBN	Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SWU	Single Working Unit (in Low Enriched Uranium)
TMD	Theatre Missile Defence
UEKhK 1UEIP)	Urals Electrochemical Combine
USEC	U.S. Enrichment Corporation
USIC	U.S. Industry Coalition
VNIIEF	All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics
VNIINM	Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials
VNIITF	All-Russian Scientific Research of Technical Physics
ZATO	“Zakrytoe Administrativno-Territorial’noe Obschestvo” ("closed" city)

Acknowledgements

This work is first of all a tribute to those in the United States and the former Soviet Union who joined efforts in addressing the requirements of the post-Cold War international system to dramatically reduce nuclear arsenals. It is also a tribute to those who believe that the two former adversaries can be true partners, and those who have contributed to building the new U.S.-Russian relationship.

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This work is dedicated to my Father, Dr. Oumirserik Kassenov, because his life example is my source of inspiration, and it is to him I owe my fascination with the world of politics. To my family and AN.

Togzhan Kassenova
Almaty
June 2007

Foreword

It is commonplace to describe the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire as a major shift in the international system. The disappearance of the threat of a major war in Europe which threatened to escalate to a global nuclear conflict without question enhanced the security of all European states immeasurably. However the social and economic dislocation and the disintegration of the political structures in the erstwhile Communist countries, especially the former Soviet Union, which accompanied the end of the Cold War created what some considered to be new and unprecedented dangers. The paradoxical consequence of the end of the Cold War is that while the threat of war receded regional ethnic and regional conflicts emerged giving rise to the actual use of force. In 1990 Soviet decision-makers had become aware of the vulnerability of tactical nuclear weapons deployed on Soviet territory itself. Soviet academics were already discussing with Western experts the problems regarding the control over nuclear weapons in the event that the Soviet Union should break up. However, no actions were taken to address this problem. In the United States it was the coup of August 1991 which galvanised the concerns of the academic community, especially at the J.F. Kennedy School at Harvard University, and the Bush administration regarding to potential consequences of the break-up of a nuclear superpower.

Fundamental to any action by the U.S. government was an assessment of the threat and the available instruments to deal with it. A report by scholars from the J.F. Kennedy School of Government entitled *Soviet Nuclear Fission* published in the autumn of 1991 brought this issue to public and government attention. It identified the following risks:

1. The break-up of the Soviet Union into its 15 constituent republics would result in the creation of new nuclear states, including four (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) with strategic nuclear weapons. This would raise profound questions about the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime (NPT), which did not envision the creation of new legitimate nuclear powers. More seriously, the nature of the governments in the newly independ-

ent states was uncertain. It was estimated that there existed considerable potential for political and even military conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons were seen as an unpredictable and potentially very dangerous element of such conflicts.

2. In times of political and social upheaval, nuclear weapons might fall into the wrong hands. Tactical nuclear weapons were seen as particularly problematic, given that many of them were deployed in crisis regions and were not adequately protected against unauthorised use.
3. Storage sites for weapons grade nuclear materials had inadequate systems for materials control and accounting and were not sufficiently protected. Consequently there was a threat for the diversion of nuclear materials. The risk of proliferation also extended to other high technology weapons components, including delivery systems, and to nuclear expertise. As funding for the nuclear weapons complex collapsed, it was perceived that of the 100,000 people employed by it might look for better paid employment elsewhere, such as in states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.

Traditional defence and arms control approaches clearly were completely unable to meet this range of perceived threats. Based on the assumption that the government of the Soviet Union (later the governments of the newly independent states, and especially Russia which still controlled most of the territory and most of the weapons), recognised the problem but was unable to resolve it with its own resources, a new programme was initiated designed to deal with it on a co-operative basis. Cooperative Threat Reduction, as it came to be called, was a radical and ambitious approach because in essence it meant that instead of pursuing defence policy by the procurement of weapons and their integration into armed forces on the basis of a national strategy, it was based on assistance for the physical protection and dismantlement of the weapons of another country. It would involve in providing direct financial and technical assistance in dealing with the most sensitive military installations in the former Soviet Union.

This book is a study of Cooperative Reduction with particular insights on the role played by Russia and the other Newly Independent States. It is to be welcomed for two special reasons. Nuclear non-proliferation is today one of the central issues in global security. Various scholars have suggested that

Cooperative Threat Reduction is a principle that can be applied globally and therefore an analytical study that explains the successes and failures of such an innovative approach that assumes cooperation on matters that hitherto were considered the most secret activities of the state is of vital significance. In particular Russian decision-making has so far not been sufficiently documented. The second reason is that is appropriate that new scholarship in this field should now involve a new generation of scholars from the Newly Independent States. As a fine example of such work this study by Togzhan Kassenova deserves to be taken seriously by academics and practitioners alike.

Christoph Bluth
Leeds
UK

1 Introduction[1]

1.1. U.S.-Russian Relations after the Cold War: Confronting the Nuclear Threat

During the Cold War the U.S. and the Soviet Union accumulated immense nuclear arsenals, and the strategic nuclear confrontation between two superpowers became one of the defining features of the bipolar international system. Once the Cold War was over, it was reasonable to expect that the transformation of the security relationship between the United States and Russia would involve a fundamental shift in its military dimension after the Cold War. While this was true for the deployment of military forces in Europe, the strategic nuclear relationship did not change in line with the changes in the global security environment. Two seemingly contradictory and yet related phenomena took place: the structure of the nuclear relationship in terms of force and alert postures remained essentially the same, albeit at lower levels; at the same time, a major cooperative programme was launched to provide for the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the safety and security of nuclear materials and other elements of the nuclear weapons complex in the former Soviet Union. This cooperative threat reduction (CTR) process significantly transcended the previous relationship based on insecurity and mistrust and constituted a genuine effort at cooperation that defied the assumptions of the international order during the Cold War period.

The immediate concern that motivated the cooperative threat reduction process was the risk of the loss of control over nuclear weapons, materials and expertise in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR and consequent social and economic dislocations in the former Soviet space. It became a more integral part of the evolving U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship as the reductions in the arsenals and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and various parts of the former Soviet Union necessitated a substan-

1 The U.S. spelling is preserved in the direct quotations and the names of private organisations.

tial programme of warhead dismantlement and nuclear materials disposition in Russia. The dismantlement process entails many difficulties of technical and socio-political nature. First of all, the process of denuclearisation raises a lot of questions for the safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials. For example, a weapon to be dismantled in Russia should be first delivered to the assembly/disassembly plant. In a situation of political and economic instability, transportation of nuclear weapons becomes very dangerous. There is a problem of technical safety of weapons being transported in special rail trains. Moreover, there is a concern that during transportation these weapons can be stolen and used by unauthorised parties (dissident military leaders, those seeking financial profit from selling them to terrorist groups and organisations, or terrorist groups themselves). Even more dangerous is the amount of nuclear materials generated by the process of dismantlement. Fissile material from dismantled weapons can be re-used and, therefore, is attractive to so called threshold/rogue states, terrorists, or those looking for a quick profit from selling illicitly acquired goods. There are also serious problems related to the storage of nuclear weapons and materials.

The denuclearisation process in Russia also means that thousands of people are being deprived of their work, privileged position in society, and simple means of existence. It is not only a matter of state responsibility to provide former employees of the Russian nuclear complex with jobs. These people possess unique knowledge which could significantly decrease the time for rogue states to obtain a nuclear capability. A growth in the number of nuclear states can undermine the global system of non-proliferation, and will greatly increase instability in the world. The CTR Programme was designed to confront these problems. Over time several other non-proliferation assistance programmes have been established to address specific problems.

The CTR Programme defies conventional thinking about strategic relations as well as public policy. This is because it involves close technical collaboration on the most secret and closely guarded elements of the military-industrial complex. It goes against the grain of national security culture, and involves a degree of cooperation and altruism that marks a very radical departure from the character of U.S.-Russian relations in the past. Moreover, it requires political leaders to overcome considerable resistance among their political elites to confront a threat that may or may not be imminent and the

overall dimensions of which are disputed and hard to estimate. This study tries to explain how CTR came into existence, assess its achievements, the extent to which its objectives were accomplished and analyse the constraints that did not allow the process to achieve its full potential or fully deal with the threat that it was designed to meet.

1.2. Conceptual Framework

The first research question identified for this study (which aims at placing the CTR process in the context of U.S.-Russian post-Cold War strategic relations) can be answered with the help of the conceptual framework described in the following section.

The first part (Chapter 2) of this work discusses the issue of U.S.-Russian strategic relations with regard to the changing role of nuclear weapons in the new international security system. It provides the basis for testing problems of implementation for each individual programme (Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7) on being dependent on political factors in U.S.-Russian strategic relations. An attempt is made to demonstrate the correlation between the significance of nuclear weapons assigned to them by Russia and the U.S. and various scenarios for bilateral relations. In order to fulfil this task the following conceptual framework (Table 1) is developed and the main schools of thought on the role of nuclear weapons are discussed.

In the below scheme four major scenarios for U.S.-Russian strategic interaction in relation to the role of nuclear weapons are presented.

Table 1 Possible Scenarios in U.S.-Russian Strategic Relations

Scenarios	*Characteristics*	*Associated Problems*
Scenario 1 **Complete Disarmament**	No nuclear arsenals retained by Russia and the U.S.	Problem of rogue/threshold states
Scenario 2 **Cooperative Denuclearisation**	Very low level of nuclear arsenals, not on alert	Denuclearisation creates additional pressure on extending cooperative threat reduction
Scenario 3 **Strategic Arms Reductions**	Reductions within START[2] framework; significant nuclear arsenals on both sides	"Strategic Paradox" resulting from too many weapons for the post—Cold War era
Scenario 4 **Strategic Confrontation**	Retention of large nuclear arsenals	Instability of the international security system

The first possible scenario represents a complete disarmament. The total elimination of the nuclear arsenals possessed by Russia and the U.S. can be perceived as the final goal of nuclear disarmament. In ideal circumstances, such an outcome would mean the disappearance of the threat of an all-out nuclear war and enhanced stability in the world. However, this picture is far from being realistic, at least, for several decades to come. Even if other nuclear powers (member states of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)) were to follow the unprecedented move of Russia and the U.S. for complete disarmament, the world will still face a number of so called rogue/threshold states and self-declared nuclear states. Taking into consideration the motives of the countries engaged in unauthorised nuclear production, it seems a much harder task to persuade them to give up their nuclear intentions. These countries almost always see the development of a nuclear programme (covert or open) as a primary matter of their national security. Being deprived of other means of guarding their security and being weak in other aspects (bad economy, low levels of conventional forces) they have no

2 START refers to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties. START-limited systems are warheads and delivery vehicles, which fall under START requirements for dismantlement.

direct influence or control over the rest of the NPT members (even in the case of their own disarmament).

The second scenario is characterised by shifting the emphasis away from nuclear weapons. In other words, the role of nuclear weapons in world politics changes dramatically. In this scenario, Russia and the U.S. would possess very small nuclear arsenals "off alert". Cooperative denuclearisation is the most viable option for the current international security system.

The main feature of the third scenario is strategic arms reductions represented by the START process. At present, START is an important part of U.S.-Russian strategic relations and is praised for reducing the number of weapons on both sides. But at the same time, this process has created the phenomenon of "strategic paradox": both countries are reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, but in absolute terms this reduction fails to make a difference.[3] After meeting the START levels, the U.S. and Russia will still remain with excessive numbers of nuclear weapons. Two countries are no longer enemies, but have the capability to destroy each other (as well as the rest of the world).

The need for nuclear deterrence is driven by elements of hostility among states. If this is removed, the preservation of nuclear relations becomes absurd. Just after the end of the Cold War, the problem of safety and security was clear-cut for the U.S. and Russian governments. Attention was drawn to the elimination, or at least reduction, of nuclear threats and dangers from the disintegrating Soviet state. Safety, not the question of nuclear relations *per se,* was, and still is, at the core of the U.S.-Russian cooperation.

The most negative scenario would be the retention of large arsenals on both sides. In other words, Russia and the U.S. would engage in a strategic confrontation as during the Cold War period. Such an outcome would mean growing instability in the world.

The distinction between these four scenarios is not clear-cut. There can be a mixture of features of more than one scenario. U.S.-Russian cooperation within the CTR framework can be a part of scenarios 2 & 3. The goal is to test the assumption that the future of cooperative threat reduction is determined

3 The term "Strategic Paradox" was first used by Christoph Bluth, *Nuclear Challenge: U.S.-Russian Strategic Relations after the Cold War*, Ashgate, 2000.

by the state of U.S.-Russian strategic relations and, in particular, by the role the countries assign to nuclear arsenals in their strategic policies.

One of the main findings of this study is that the CTR process is influenced by the unique conditions of the post-Cold War international security environment. Political factors are no less important than bureaucratic factors and, occasionally, there is no clear separation between political and bureaucratic factors.

The post-Cold War international security system calls for a re-evaluation of nuclear strategies by the U.S. and Russia and demands re-examination of U.S.-Russian strategic relations. They are still based on the dominant role of nuclear weapons. The role of nuclear arsenals has to be reconsidered since their justification as a means of deterrence and war-fighting has been considerably reduced due to the changed nature of conflicts and new security requirements since the end of the Cold War. (See the discussion on the role of nuclear weapons in Chapter 2)

The responses of two largest nuclear powers and former adversaries to the changed nature of their relationship and the international system in general have been contradictory. On the one hand, one can say that the U.S. and Russia have failed so far to adjust their strategic relations to the new security environment. Their nuclear postures are still more appropriate for the Cold War period. Despite the positive rhetoric, U.S.-Russian relations are still far from constituting a true partnership. More than a decade since the end of the Cold War, many aspects of the bilateral relations are influenced by lingering Cold War thinking, lack of trust, and cultural differences.

On the other hand, despite the above caveats, the START process and the cooperative threat reduction process, as well as the U.S.-Russian interaction in various non-proliferation fora exhibit the level of cooperation and a sense of joint responsibility for the future of nuclear weapons arsenals that are more in line with a strategic partnership. The CTR Programme not only took off the ground but has led to the development of the cooperative threat reduction process. This process now incorporates an array of programmes managed by different state agencies, aimed at addressing specific proliferation concerns. Many obstacles, including the culture of secrecy and suspicion, conflicting interests of the key players, general confusion in post-Cold War international relations, and not fully articulated foreign policy objectives, were

overcome, if not fully, then to a considerable extent. The fact that cooperative threat reduction programmes are fighting their way through the bureaucratic and political jungle deserves praise. It demonstrates that new political thinking, and a shift from Cold War practices, are gradually developing in the United States and Russia, despite the obstacles that exist in both countries.

1.3. U.S.-Russian Relations in the Contemporary International System

Finding an appropriate theoretical framework for this study serves two purposes. First, it provides a necessary structure for conducting research (i.e. gives us "conceptual lenses"), and second, it helps to place the current research into a wider discourse on international relations (IR) theories and the nature of the international system after the Cold War.

The weight of the "political" factor is to be examined based on the analysis of U.S.-Russian strategic relations in the post-Cold War era. To structure this analysis, the study identifies four possible scenarios of bilateral strategic relations with a focus on the role of nuclear weapons (Chapter 2). The examination of U.S.-Russian relations after the end of the Cold War calls for questioning the factors that motivate foreign policy, perceptions of security threats, and views on cooperative security held by Russia and the United States.

Such an examination is expected to yield insights into the validity of some major IR theories in explaining the behaviour of states during and after the Cold War (for example, realism and neo-realism). The experience of the CTR process during the last decade questions some of the main assumptions of realism about the nature of the international system. Realism, in its most recent manifestation of "offensive realism" outlined by John Mearsheimer, reaffirms the anarchical nature of the international system after the Cold War. It asserts that the structure of the international system forces states to act aggressively towards each other in their pursuit of "security".[4]

4 John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001, p. 3.

Even if we concede that realism was a useful approach to study the international system in the Cold War period, it appears inappropriate for the contemporary era. The assumption that the international system is anarchical does not seem to be borne out by empirical observation. Quite the opposite, states generally accept very substantial normative constraints in their relations, especially in relation to the use of force. The prevalence of inter-state conflicts in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse has not been realised. Armed conflicts in the post-Cold War world are almost exclusively sub-state, involving ethnic rivalry or non-state actors (e.g. terrorism). With the exception of some specific, confined regional problems, states generally do not fear external aggression from other states. Especially in Europe and the Americas, states generally do not experience a "security dilemma". Consequently military expenditures in most countries (with the United States, Israel and South Korea being notable exceptions) have declined precipitously, and the notion of a "national defence" policy has been all but abandoned.

During the time period under consideration, the United States and Russia sought to develop a relationship that would be part of a different international order based on international norms, cooperation and cooperative security. This involved the adoption of policies designed to eliminate the legacy of the Cold War and create a new foundation for the mutual security relationship. CTR was to be one important element designed to deal with the dangers of the Cold War nuclear heritage and develop a cooperative approach to nuclear safety and security. The intellectual foundation of this approach is explicitly contrary to the assumptions and notions of realism.

The nature of current security threats, especially in terms of potential conflicts, is important because it sheds light on the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War international security system. The fact that the main security threats confronting states in our age are either internal (economic instability, insecurity of the governing regimes, environmental dangers, etc.) or are coming from sub-state actors (e.g. the threat of terrorism), calls for a revised role for nuclear weapons in the security policies of the states. Nuclear weapons can neither deter nor be used as war-fighting tools in the sub-strategic type of conflicts more common in the post-Cold War era (see Chapter 2).

The evidence of changes in the structure of international security and U.S.-Russian relationship specifically confronts us with a "strategic paradox".

The structure of the strategic nuclear relationship has remained intact in terms of force deployments, even though the erstwhile political rationale no longer applies. As far as CTR is concerned, the priority and commitment given to the programmes do not match the urgency of the threat as portrayed by its promoters in the U.S. administration or the Russian government. It seems, therefore, that systemic explanations are not adequate to explain the phenomena under consideration.

Consequently, this study aims to develop an explanatory model that accounts for the development of the CTR Programme and its consecutive growth into several independent non-proliferation programmes (in the context of the post-Cold War international system), the failure to address what has been recognised as one of the most serious threats to international security effectively, and the conditions that would allow the CTR process to succeed. In this respect, a particular emphasis is placed on the theoretical framework that relates domestic politics (bureaucratic politics) to the definition of national interest and international behaviour. One of the main findings of this study is that bureaucratic politics played a major role in the way the CTR process evolved (the extent of this influence and dependence of bureaucratic politics on broader political factors are examined throughout Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7).

This work attempts to grasp a complicated and intertwining net of key players in both countries. By defining vested organisational interests and values it is possible to understand the mechanisms both stimulating and constraining the implementation of non-proliferation programmes.

The argument of this work is that confusion or sometimes even rejection of important aspects of cooperative threat reduction programmes by different government agencies and departments demonstrates controversy in the post-Cold War relations between Russia and the U.S., and that it is a result of varying organisational interests and values of key political actors involved.

The key players in CTR decision-making are often large influential organisations, such as the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD), State Department, Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma, the former Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) (now Russian Fed-

eral Agency of Atomic Energy (ROSATOM)),[5] and Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD). There is a complex system of interrelations and interdependencies between various structures of state power. Different organisations pursue different and sometimes conflicting interests. There is also a serious lack of coordination among different agencies responsible for specific programmes. The way the bureaucratic system operates in the U.S. and Russia prevents a smooth and straightforward implementation of CTR projects.

The example of U.S.-Russian cooperation at the level of nuclear laboratories, which involved nuclear scientists and was successful in avoiding bureaucratic hurdles, demonstrated the ability of epistemic communities to act beyond the immediate Cold War reflexes (typical for large state organisations). The important role played by non-governmental think-tanks can also be considered from the same angle. Independent non-proliferation scholars tend to be more liberal in their views of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and are putting pressure on their governments to further engage in cooperative threat reduction.

The emphasis on bureaucratic politics does not imply that other factors, and in particular the objectives pursued by the political leadership, are not important components of the explanation of the evolution of the CTR process. On the contrary, political priorities set form an essential part of the story of cooperative threat reduction.

It is a well-established principle in the strategic arms control literature that the objective of arms control is not only to regulate technical aspects of the strategic relationship, but more importantly to develop political relations. Indeed, some have argued that during the Cold War this was the principal purpose of strategic arms control.[6] Technical negotiations become a vector of larger political settlements. In view of the radical nature of CTR programmes and the stated intentions of its proponents, the assumption is made that this

5 In March 2004 in the process of administrative reform, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) was transformed into Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (ROSATOM). For events that took place prior to reorganisation, I continue to refer to MINATOM.

6 Christoph Bluth, *Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992; Robin Ranger, *Arms & Politics 1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context*, Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1979.

general principle also applies to CTR. Thus, although this study is focused on some specific technical programmes, it attempts to demonstrate that there is an obvious link between their implementation and larger issues in U.S.-Russian strategic relations in the post-Cold War period. An evaluation of U.S.-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War provides insights into the validity of different perspectives on the contemporary world order. On the surface, the U.S.-Russian partnership in the framework of CTR programmes goes against the realist notion of the "aggressive pursuit of power"; it appears to be a manifestation of a major shift in the international system, as former antagonistic powers search for a new form of interaction. The fact that the United States and Russia are willing to cooperate appears to go against the realist argument that "international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests".[7]

The behaviour of different U.S. administrations (under Clinton and Bush) assessed in this work can be looked at from the angle of opposing theoretical schools. The way the Clinton administration was constructing its policies towards Russia reflects the ideas promoted by republican liberalism linking democracy with peace.[8] Thus, for example, the democratic peace theory assigns democracy an important role in decreasing the likelihood of war.[9] The experience of the early and mid-1990s shows that the Clinton administration[10] was pursuing a policy of "democratising" Russia; President Clinton valued engaging Russia and supporting democratic processes in the country as crucial to the international security of the post-Cold War era. Likewise, in Russia certain political forces were adopting values of liberalism. Chapter 2 describes the divide in Russia during the early years of the Yeltsin cabinet between liberals and traditionalists. The first were promoting Russia's engage-

7 As defined by Joseph Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism' in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p. 116.

8 David Baldwin, 'Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics' in Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, p. 4.

9 Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993.

10 During both Clinton terms in office.

ment with the world economy and integration into the international community through adopting Western democratic values. The latter were seeing the world from the realist position and were not ready to embrace a changing world order.

The Bush administration[11] seems to be more inclined to draw ideas from the realist school by rejecting values of institutionalism and giving preference to unilateral policies in its search of security. The problem with such policies is that the post-Cold War world order is developing under the conditions which do not support realist explanations: most security threats states are facing (threats from sub-state actors, environmental dangers, internal domestic problems) cannot be deterred by trying to weaken the other states. Cooperation between states and adherence to institutionalist values (respect for international mechanisms) are needed to confront most of these threats. As George Perkovich argues, by adopting an inappropriate nuclear policy and neglecting the international regimes of non-proliferation while demanding compliance of others, the Bush administration loses much of the soft power instruments that would render its policies of nuclear non-proliferation and counterproliferation much more effective.[12] The current study focuses on the effects of the shift in U.S. nuclear policy on the CTR process.

In sum, it appears that the post-Cold War world order, which is in the process of transition, cannot be explained on the basis of simply realist or liberal schools of thought. There are conflicting trends in the policies of the countries (in this case, the examples of Russia and the United States). This study considers the effectiveness of policies dealing with certain security threats (e.g. nuclear proliferation, illegal smuggling and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)) based on cooperation, as opposed to the unilateral projection of power. Technical issues raised in this work (such as the danger of accidental nuclear war or the unauthorised use of nuclear weapons – Chapter 2) are related to the arguments for a reduction of nuclear arsenals on both sides. A dramatic reduction of arsenals is more likely if the U.S. and Russia see their own security in having fewer weapons rather than

11 During both Bush terms in office.

12 George Perkovich, 'Bush's Nuclear Follies', Foreign Affairs, Vol.82, No.2, 2003, pp. 2-8.

having more (i.e. a move away from the balance of power towards that of common security). The role that CTR might play both in provoking and facilitating such a shift is also examined.

The case studies of different proliferation threats connected with nuclear weapons and materials as presented in Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7 can contribute to the debate on the role of nuclear weapons (presented in Chapter 2), and whether more nuclear weapons in the world would mean more or less security. Risks associated with large nuclear arsenals suggest that their presence does not entail more security, especially in the light of the end of the Cold War superpower stand-off (the "deterrent" value has diminished), the rise on international terrorism (threat of illegal use), and the changing nature of conflict in the world (a shift towards sub-strategic conflicts, in which nuclear weapons play no role).

The major finding of this study is as follows: The U.S. and Russia are still in the process of adjusting to the changed post-Cold War environment. The main features of the contemporary international system of states include the absence of a systemic great power conflict, the obsolescence of Marxism-Leninism as an alternative to capitalism and liberal democracy, and the increasing acceptance of international norms by most states, with conflicts largely involving sub-state actors. In this New World Order, the United States and Russia are partners, rather than adversaries, in a cooperative rather than competitive security relationship. However, the process of adaptation to the new international environment remains incomplete. Aspects of foreign and security policy, especially nuclear policy, are still informed by attitudes and ideas that stem from the time when the United States and the Soviet Union were bitter adversaries. The example of cooperative threat reduction as a case study of U.S.-Russian strategic relations shows that although considerable achievements were made and cooperation such as in the CTR framework became possible, this cooperation has been limited and constrained by factors of bureaucratic and political nature. At the political level, the attempt by political leaders to reconstruct the security relationship has to some extent been impeded by the failure of political elites to fully come to terms with the realities of the contemporary international order. At the same time, bureaucratic politics slowed down change at the level of implementation. The CTR process reflects both the attempts to engage in a very radical reconstruction

of U.S.-Russian security relations and the constraints imposed upon it by political recalcitrance and bureaucratic politics.

The following were the main objectives of the research:

1. An analysis of the post-Cold War U.S.-Russian strategic relationship with an emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic policies; an evaluation of the political environment of the post-Cold War international security system in order to identify how the CTR process fits into broader bilateral relations and to test the assumption that political factors influence the CTR process at the level of implementation. Such an analysis is also necessary for establishing a link between the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.-Russian relations and the future of the CTR process.An integrated and comprehensive account of the major non-proliferation programmes: the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme (CTR Programme), the Material Protection, Control and Accounting Programme (MPC&A), the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), the International Technology and Science Centre (ISTC), the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), the Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement (referred to as the HEU Deal), and the Plutonium Disposition Programme; an assessment of perceived proliferation threats and effectiveness of the programmes in terms of confronting stated threats, the future prospects of the programmes and the extent to which the non-proliferation goals of the states have been achieved; the development of an explanatory model that accounts for the development of the CTR process in the context of the post-Cold War international system, problems of implementation, and the conditions that will allow CTR to succeed. The identification of the nature of the problems of implementation is crucial to explaining why the CTR process has been limited in its scope and what will allow it to move beyond the current constraints.